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This article responds to a new objection, due to Ben Bramble, against attitudinal theories
of sensory pleasure and pain: the objection from unconscious pleasures and pains.
According to the objection, attitudinal theories are unable to accommodate the fact that
sometimes we experience pleasures and pains of which we are, at the time, unaware.
In response, I distinguish two kinds of unawareness and argue that the subjects in the
examples that support the objection are unaware of their sensations in only a weak sense,
and this weak sort of unawareness of a sensation does not preclude its being an object of
one’s attitudes.
BACKGROUND
On the one hand, there are sensations, such as the feeling of touching
velvet, the ring of a 440 Hz tuning fork, and the smell of a blooming
lilac bush. On the other hand, there are attitudes or intentional states,
which we can have towards states of the world, as when we believe
that it is raining or wish that it would stop, as well as towards
our own sensations, as when we believe that we are smelling lilac
or dislike the feeling we are getting from touching velvet. Similarly,
we can distinguish these two kinds of pleasure: sensory pleasure
and attitudinal pleasure. Sensory pleasures are what many of us
experience when we step into a hot shower on a cold day, bite into
a juicy peach, or smell freshly baked bread. They involve pleasant
sensations. Attitudinal pleasure is what we get when we are pleased
that something is the case, such as that it has stopped raining. These
hedonic phenomena have opposites too, of course. There are unpleasant
sensations, such as the smell of skunk, and attitudinal displeasures, as
when one is displeased that the rain has started up again.
According to attitudinal theories of sensory pleasure and
unpleasantness, for a subject to be experiencing sensory pleasure at
some time is, roughly, for the subject to be experiencing a sensation
at that time that the subject has a positive attitude towards at that
time. The positive attitude might be desire,1 attitudinal pleasure,2 or
1 Chris Heathwood, ‘The Reduction of Sensory Pleasure to Desire’, Philosophical
Studies 133 (2007), pp. 23–44.
2 Fred Feldman, ‘Two Questions about Pleasure’, Philosophical Analysis: A Defense
by Example, ed. D. Austin (Dordrecht, 1988), pp. 59–81.
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liking.3 Unpleasant sensations are analysed in terms of some negative
attitude. What about painful sensations? Those are covered by the
theory in one way, since all painful sensations are unpleasant, but
not in another way, since attitudinal theories of sensory pleasure and
unpleasantness may not say what distinguishes painful sensations
from those that are unpleasant without being painful. We will ignore
that perplexing question here.4
In a recent article, Ben Bramble presents a novel and interesting
objection to attitudinal theories: the objection from unconscious
pleasures. He believes it to be ‘a decisive objection to attitude theories’,
and one that he suggests can get us past the current stalemate
in the debate between attitudinal theories of sensory pleasure and
their non-attitudinal competitors.5 My aim in this article is to defend
attitudinal theories of sensory pleasure and pain against the objection
from unconscious pleasures and pains.
BRAMBLE’S ARGUMENT FROM UNCONSCIOUS
PLEASURES AND PAINS
According to Bramble,
one can have unpleasant experiences that one is entirely unaware of at the
time of experience. If [this is] right, then of course there can be unpleasant
experiences whose subjects have no negative attitudes toward them at the time
of experience. This is because one can hardly have the relevant kind of attitude
(be it disliking, not wanting, disvaluing, or whatever) toward an experience
that one is entirely unaware of.6
Bramble cites a number of interesting examples. One involving an
unpleasant sensation is due to Daniel Haybron:
Perhaps you have lived with a refrigerator that often whined due to a bad
bearing. If so, you might have found that, with time, you entirely ceased to
notice the racket. But occasionally, when the compressor stopped, you did notice
3 Richard J. Hall, ‘Are Pains Necessarily Unpleasant?’, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 49 (1989), pp. 643–59.
4 In what follows, to avoid stilted language, sometimes I say ‘pain’ when it might be
more accurate to say ‘unpleasantness’. At other times I talk only about pleasure when
the point would apply to unpleasantness as well.
5 Ben Bramble, ‘The Distinctive Feeling Theory of Pleasure’, Philosophical Studies
162 (2013), pp. 201–17, at 203–4. One such competitor is the distinctive feeling theory,
on which sensations like the smell of freshly baked bread or the taste of a peach cause a
further, distinct sensation, the sensation of pleasure itself (G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica
(Cambridge, 1903), §12; Bramble, ‘Distinctive Feeling Theory’). Another non-attitudinal
theory of sensory pleasure is the hedonic tone theory, on which pleasurableness is an
abstract sensory determinable of which certain determinate sensations, such as the smell
of freshly baked bread or the taste of a peach, are instances (C. D. Broad, Five Types of
Ethical Theory (London, 1930), pp. 229–37).
6 Bramble, ‘Distinctive Feeling Theory’, p. 204, italics removed.
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the sudden, glorious silence. You might also have noted . . . that you’d had no
idea how obnoxious the noise was – or that it was occurring at all – until it
ceased. But obnoxious it was, and all the while it had been, unbeknownst to
you, fouling your experience as you went about your business. In short, you’d
been having an unpleasant experience without knowing it.7
A real-life case involving pleasure is discussed in neurologist Oliver
Sacks’s book The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat. Sacks’s patient,
quoted here, lost his sense of smell after a head injury:
Sense of smell? . . . I never gave it a thought. You don’t normally give it a
thought. But when I lost it – it was like being struck blind. Life lost a good
deal of its savour – one doesn’t realise how much ‘savour’ is smell. You smell
people, you smell books, you smell the city, you smell the spring – maybe not
consciously, but as a rich unconscious background to everything else. My whole
world was suddenly radically poorer.8
Stuart Rachels discusses what he calls ‘background pleasure’ and
cites this example from Sacks.9 Rachels points out that Leibniz and
Mill were aware of our phenomenon. ‘Mill’, for example, ‘contrasts
“the occasional brilliant flash of enjoyment” with “its permanent
and steady flame” ’.10 As the Mill quotation suggests, and as Sacks’s
patient and Rachels’s discussion make clear, unconscious pleasures and
displeasures aren’t just fringe phenomena. They are occurring all the
time and all the while affecting the quality of our lives. It is important
that theories of pleasure be able to accommodate them.
Bramble’s argument requires two main premises. First,
(P1) There is unconscious sensory pleasure and unpleasantness.
This is sensory pleasure or unpleasantness that is genuinely a part
of a person’s experience, but that the person does not realize they are
experiencing. As Haybron puts it, the person was ‘having an unpleasant
experience without knowing it’. As Sacks’s patient puts it, the pleasure
is experienced ‘not consciously, but as a rich unconscious background
to everything else’. The support for (P1) is provided simply by the
examples above, and others like them. I have no quarrel with (P1),
nor with describing them as ‘unconscious’ or as sensations of which we
are ‘unaware’ (Bramble tends to use the latter term). I take Haybron’s
description and the testimony of Sacks’s patient at face value. I have
7 Daniel M. Haybron, The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-
Being (Oxford, 2008), p. 205.
8 Oliver Sacks, The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat and Other Clinical Tales
(New York, 1987), p. 159.
9 Stuart Rachels, ‘Six Theses about Pleasure’, Philosophical Perspectives 18 (2004),
pp. 247–67, at 254–6.
10 Rachels, ‘Six Theses’, p. 255, quoting from J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism (London, 1863),
ch. 2, §12.
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had similar experiences myself – and of course much more often than I
realize.
I’ll formulate Bramble’s second premise simply as follows:
(P2) If there is unconscious sensory pleasure and unpleasantness,
then attitudinal theories of sensory pleasure and unpleasantness
are false.
Bramble’s rationale for P2 is key, and is where the action lies. It is a
principle we can call
NO AWARENESS, NO ATTITUDE:
If a person is unaware that they are experiencing a certain sensation
at a certain time, then it is not possible for them to have an attitude
towards that sensation at that time.
It’s worth emphasizing that the sort of attitude that features in NO
AWARENESS, NO ATTITUDE is a de re rather than de dicto attitude, or
what some philosophers call ‘singular thought’. When NO AWARENESS,
NO ATTITUDE says that it is not possible for the person to have an
attitude towards an unconscious sensation, that is not to deny that
the person might have a desire to be experiencing some sensation or
other of that very kind. Bramble’s language – ‘one can hardly have the
relevant kind of attitude . . . toward an experience that one is entirely
unaware of’11 – suggests this interpretation. So does the principle of
charity, for NO AWARENESS, NO ATTITUDE would be implausible on its
face otherwise. If I am unaware that I am smelling a certain smell, it
certainly doesn’t follow that I cannot, perhaps just by coincidence, have
a desire to be smelling some smell or other of exactly that kind. NO
AWARENESS, NO ATTITUDE doesn’t disagree. It is just saying that I can’t
have a desire (or any other attitude) towards smelling the particular
instance of the smell that I am (unconsciously) smelling.
The de re understanding of NO AWARENESS, NO ATTITUDE also enjoys
a certain sort of rationale. A de re attitude is an attitude about a
particular thing. It is widely accepted that in order to have a de re
attitude towards a particular thing, one has to be acquainted with the
thing. And if you have no awareness of a certain something – such as
the sensations in the Haybron and Sacks cases – then it seems plausible
to say that you are not acquainted with it. Thus, you can’t have de re
attitudes towards them.
And this weaker de re interpretation of NO AWARENESS, NO ATTITUDE
is still strong enough to make trouble for attitudinal theories of sensory
pleasure and unpleasantness, since the best formulation of these
11 Bramble, ‘Distinctive Feeling Theory’, p. 204, italics mine.
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theories will also be de re. This is because those who are committed to
an attitudinal theory should not want to say that pleasure is occurring
in the sorts of coincidence cases just described – such as a case in which
one is unaware that one is smelling a certain smell but, by coincidence,
has a general or de dicto desire to be smelling a smell of exactly the
kind that one is, unbeknownst to one, unconsciously smelling.12
REPLY TO BRAMBLE’S ARGUMENT
I think we can reply effectively to Bramble’s argument if we distinguish
between a stronger and a weaker way of being unaware of one’s
own phenomenal states. It’s true that if we are what we can call
strongly unaware that we are experiencing some sensation, attitudinal
theories of sensory pleasure and unpleasantness might imply that
that sensation cannot be a pleasant or unpleasant sensation. But
this does not conflict with our judgements about the cases above, for
the sort of unawareness that features in these cases is different. In
these examples, the subject is unaware that they are experiencing the
sensation in only a weaker sense. This weak unawareness, I will argue,
does not preclude being the object of de re attitudes.
Haybron claims that when you are experiencing the unpleasant
whining of the refrigerator, you don’t notice it. Sacks’s patient says
that many of the pleasant smells that enrich our experiences of the
world are unconscious smell sensations. These claims are true, on one
reading. But I think that there is another sense in which you do notice
the whining and in which the smells are conscious. That sense is this: if
the sensations were to cease, the subject would notice their cessation.
Or, rather, that this counterfactual is true of someone indicates that
they enjoy a certain sort of awareness of the sensations, which we can
call weak awareness. And indeed, such conditional claims are built into
our examples: ‘when the compressor stopped, you did notice the sudden,
glorious silence’; ‘when I lost it – it was like being struck blind’.
So I submit that if a person is undergoing an experience, and the
experience is such that if it were to stop, the person would notice that,
then there is a sense in which the person is aware of the experience,
or in which the experience is a conscious experience. That one would
notice its cessation shows that it is there as a genuine part of one’s
conscious experience. Why is that? Perhaps the answer is that to notice
its cessation is to notice a change in some aspect of one’s experience,
and one can notice a change in some aspect of one’s experience only
if one had some kind of awareness of how one’s experience was with
12 My own attitudinal theory explicitly requires the attitude to be de re (Heathwood,
‘Reduction of Sensory Pleasure’, pp. 31–2).
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respect to that aspect before the change and also an awareness of how
it was with respect to that aspect after the change.
The Haybron and Sacks subjects experience sensations whose
cessation they would notice (and in fact do notice, when the sensations
do cease). In what sense, then, are they unaware of these sensations?
Perhaps it is this: they do not, before the sensation stops, occurrently be-
lieve that they are experiencing the sensation, at least not confidently,
and nor would they come to believe it even if they were to attend to
the question.13 Even if they were to attend to the matter, they might
be uncertain whether they are hearing the sound. If Haybron asks you
whether you hear the refrigerator whining, you might stop, listen, and
be unsure. You might even positively deny hearing it, despite the fact
that it is indeed whining and that you are indeed hearing it (hearing
it in the sense that if the noise were to stop, you would notice that). I
myself have had just these sorts of experiences. I have tried to tell if I
am hearing some noise going on, and been genuinely unable to tell.
Similarly, if Sacks’s patient had been asked, before his injury, during
a walk outside, ‘Do you smell the city?’, he may very well have replied,
after some thought, ‘No, I don’t think I smell anything.’ Thus, Haybron’s
refrigerator owner and Sacks’s patient are unaware – though just
weakly unaware – of certain sensations that they are in fact experienc-
ing: they fail to confidently, occurrently believe that they are experienc-
ing them, and may not even be poised to do so. But they are not strongly
unaware of them: they would (and in fact do) notice their cessation.
That the subject would notice it if the sensation were to stop shows
that the sensation is a part of the subject’s awareness (in some sense of
awareness). But it is evidently not constitutive of this sort of awareness.
For there are finkish cases in which, although the subject is disposed
to notice the sensation’s cessation, if the sensation were in fact to
cease, they wouldn’t notice the cessation, due to some quirk. Suppose,
for example, that one’s sentience is being artificially supported by a
machine. If the machine finks out, one instantly loses consciousness.
Such a machine might be making a noise of which one is merely weakly
unaware, and so of which one is aware in just the way that the Haybron
13 Or at least they would not easily come to believe this. Since this notion of ease comes
in degrees, weak unawareness lies on a spectrum. Perhaps the relevant dimension is
how much attention-paying would be required on one’s part to come to believe that one
is experiencing the sensation (if it is even possible, in a given case, for one to come to
believe this). At one end of the spectrum is the case in which one does not occurrently
believe that one is experiencing the sensation but would come to believe it after just a
little reflection if one were to consider the question. At the other end of the spectrum is
the case in which not only does one not believe that one is experiencing the sensation, but
one would continue to fail to believe it no matter how much one attended to the matter
and how hard one tried to notice the sensation.
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and Sacks subjects are aware of their sensations. Suppose that this
machine’s noise stops if and only if the machine stops. It would then be
false that one would notice the cessation of this sensation even though
one is in fact weakly aware of it.14
There is thus some underlying way of relating to the sensation
that is common in this case and the Haybron and Sacks cases, even
though the relevant counterfactual is true only in the Haybron and
Sacks cases. I don’t know the best way to characterize this relation,
but I believe that we have successfully identified it, via means of this
counterfactual test, which holds in the normal case. This relation is
the weak unawareness relation.
Just to be clear, since weak unawareness involves being in a way
unaware and in a way aware, it can also be thought of as weak
awareness. In sum:
Weak unawareness (a.k.a. weak awareness):
(i) unaware in that one doesn’t confidently, occurrently believe
that one is experiencing the sensation (and even if one
attended to the matter, still might not); but
(ii) aware in that if the sensation were to cease, one would notice
that (finkish cases aside).
But strong unawareness involves unawareness in both senses:
Strong unawareness:
(i) unaware in that one doesn’t confidently, occurrently believe
that one is experiencing the sensation (and even if one
attended to the matter, still would not); and also
(ii) unaware in that if the sensation were to cease, one wouldn’t
even notice that (even in non-finkish cases).
A question somewhat tangential to our purposes is: Is strong
unawareness of one’s own sensory states even possible? Can it be
that a person is genuinely experiencing some sensation – a whining
sound, a city smell – and not only do they fail to believe that they
are experiencing it (they are at least weakly unaware of it), but if the
experience were to cease, they wouldn’t even notice that (they are also
strongly unaware of it) – and not because the case is finkish or because
they are distracted? Finkish and distracted cases aside, I am tempted to
14 I am grateful to Joshua Watson here. A related kind of case involves distracted
subjects. A subject might be weakly aware of a sensation even though, were it to cease,
the subject would fail to notice that, due to the fact that, were it to cease, the subject
would happen to be distracted at the moment of cessation.
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say that if the person wouldn’t even notice it if the experience stopped,
then the alleged sensation was never in fact a part of their experience in
the first place. I find this view tempting even in cases in which there are
physiological or behavioural indicators that one’s body is registering the
stimulus. However, I don’t need to take a stand on this here. The most
that I might need to take a stand on here is that if strongly unconscious
sensations are possible, they cannot be pleasant or unpleasant.15 But
in fact it’s not even clear that I need to say that much. I’ll explain why
below in a footnote.
So, Bramble’s argument gets us to see that attitudinal theorists of
sensory pleasure and unpleasantnessmight be committed to the impos-
sibility of strongly unconscious sensory pleasure and unpleasantness.
But more importantly, it gets us to see that they are pretty clearly com-
mitted to a second thing: that we can take up attitudes towards experi-
ences that we are weakly unaware of. I’d now like to defend this claim.
To begin, note that once we draw the distinction between strong and
weak unawareness and see that the people in Bramble’s key examples
are merely weakly unaware of their sensations – that is, once we see
that there is a perfectly good sense in which they are aware of their
sensations – I’m not sure that there is any reason to deny that they
can take up attitudes towards these sensations. Consider these two
variants of NO AWARENESS, NO ATTITUDE:
WEAK UNAWARENESS, NO ATTITUDE:
If a person is weakly unaware that they are experiencing a certain
sensation at a certain time, then it is not possible for them to have
an attitude towards that sensation at that time.
STRONG UNAWARENESS, NO ATTITUDE:
If a person is strongly unaware that they are experiencing a certain
sensation at a certain time, then it is not possible for them to have
an attitude towards that sensation at that time.
Since de re or singular thought plausibly requires some kind of aware-
ness of or acquaintance with the object of the thought, STRONG UN-
AWARENESS, NO ATTITUDE is plausible.16 But why think it makes WEAK
15 My opponent may want to insist that there are these strongly unconscious
sensations, that some of them are pleasant or unpleasant, and that attitudinal theories
cannot accommodate this second fact. I agree that attitudinal theories may not be able
to accommodate this (though see the next footnote), but because it is so unclear whether
there are any such sensations and also, if there are some, whether any of them are
pleasant or unpleasant, an objection founded on them lacks dialectical force.
16 Though perhaps not undeniable. Perhaps we can be unconsciously aware of strongly
unconscious sensations, and thus have unconscious attitudes towards them. Attitudinal
theories of sensory pleasure and unpleasantness would then imply that there can be
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UNAWARENESS, NO ATTITUDE plausible? Why think that being aware of
a sensation in the weak sense that one would at least notice its cessation
is not sufficient to be in a position to have singular thoughts about that
sensation? The sensation is there in your consciousness, in the sense de-
scribed. Why can’t that be enough for one to be able to be averse to it, or
to like it? Bramble, at least, has given us no reason to think that it can’t.
And there are positive arguments for thinking that one can have such
attitudes. Consider Haybron’s case. The refrigerator is whining loudly.
Deep in your work, you don’t notice it. Then the compressor stops, and
you do notice the sudden, glorious silence. You also realize this: that
‘all the while it had been, unbeknownst to you, fouling your experience
as you went about your business’.17 Now consider this question: All the
while, had the noise been, unbeknownst to you, bothering you? Surely
the answer is ‘Yes’. Surely if it is true that a sensation was ‘fouling
your experience’, then it follows that the sensation was bothering you.
It sounds contradictory to say, ‘this smell is fouling my experience,
though it’s not bothering me at all’. But bother consists in having an
attitude. To be bothered by something is to mind it or to be annoyed
by it or disturbed by it. If someone is bothered by the fact that it is
raining, that person has an attitude towards the fact that it is raining.
Likewise, if they are bothered by the refrigerator’s whining, they have
an attitude towards that. Thus, not only is there no reason to deny
that the subject in Haybron’s case could have been having a negative
attitude towards the whining sound, it seems clear that they were
having such an attitude.
But if WEAK UNAWARENESS, NO ATTITUDE is false, then the argument
from unconscious pleasures fails. STRONG UNAWARENESS, NO ATTITUDE
is plausible, but is of no help, as Haybron’s and Sacks’s subjects are not
strongly unaware of the relevant sensations. WEAK UNAWARENESS, NO
ATTITUDE is what is needed to generate the problem for attitudinal
theories of sensory pleasure and unpleasantness, but this principle is
both unmotivated and open to counterexample. I conclude that the
problem of unconscious pleasures for attitudinal theories of pleasure
admits of a satisfying solution.18
heathwood@colorado.edu
strongly unconscious sensory pleasure and unpleasantness. It would be a further question
whether such sensations make our lives better or worse.
17 Haybron, Pursuit of Unhappiness, p. 205.
18 I am grateful to audiences at the Affective Experience: Pain and Pleasure Workshop
at York University in 2015; at the Fifth Annual Tennessee Value and Agency Conference:
Pleasure and Pain at the University of Tennessee in 2016; and at the Center for Values
and Social Policy at the University of Colorado Boulder in 2016. For extensive feedback,
special thanks to Ben Bramble, Anthony Kelley, Eden Lin, and Rob Rupert.
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